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Abstract
Preferences to alleviate the burden imposed on caregivers by caring for the elderly
have not been investigated due to features that cannot be directly observed. We
conducted choice experiments (CE) on the attributes of care services provided to
the elderly at home throughout Japan to estimate caregivers’ preferences for care
plans.The caregivers prefer care plans that consist of more formal care and day-time
services, while less time should be spent in care by the family. Care payments should
also be made weekly. We also found that caregivers reached a consensus that there
was excessive burden imposed when family members were involved in informal long-
term care since their heterogeneity of preferences was more moderate than that of
caregivers who were not supported by family members.We found that we should take
into consideration the implementation of certain compensation schemes to alleviate
the burden imposed on family members. We suggest some example compensation
schemes from overseas that are suited to the Japanese situation.
Key words: Elderly care burden, choice experiment, informal care, random parameter
logit model, compensation scheme
1 Introduction
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) has been conducting and man-
aging an insurance system for elderly care and formal-care services since April 1, 2000
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throughout Japan. The system has ensured that beneﬁciaries pay fees more transpar-
ently. Since there are increasing quantities and sorts of formal-care services, the elderly
in Japan have become familiar with using the system. As the burden of elderly care
has been increasing, formal care should become more professional and better organized.
The number of caregivers should be increased not only from the viewpoint of welfare
economics but also from that of labor economics. Formal care can become one of the
largest industries in Japan.
However, the present system has recently been confronted by crises that threaten its
eradication. There have been prevailing overuses of formal care coupled with economic
deﬂation, which have led to the ﬁnancial crisis. If these cannot be rectiﬁed, evidence
has shown that the social costs of long-term care will increasingly induce breakdowns in
society (Grabowski and Gruber (2007)) throughout Japan. There have been some cases
of overuse where care receivers who require comparatively low degrees of care in Japan
have been over-serviced. It is high time that the system and the overall concept were
improved. We in Japan should take into consideration not just formal care but informal
care to cope with deﬁciencies in the system and avoid the adverse eﬀects the ﬁnancial
crisis is having on long-term-care services.
We need to investigate what people prefer and how they perceive the burden of elderly
care to consider informal care. Since informal care tends to be given by family members
of the elderly, it is often overlooked, which has led to the scarcity of existing studies,
especially from the microeconomic perspective in Japan. The preference structure or
demand by family members for informal care should be clariﬁed. We need to conduct in-
person surveys and construct a national database for informal care, neither of which has
been implemented in Japan. According to Fujisawa and Colombo (2009), the number of
long-term care recipients and elderly people are increasing not only in Japan but all over
East Asia, such as in South Korea. Furthermore, they state that “it is not unusual for
intensive informal carers to incur health or mental problems themselves” (Fujisawa and
Colombo (2009), p.5). It seems possible to extend to housekeepers or part-time workers
the notion that informal care still plays an important role in how well-developed formal
care will be. Thus, political considerations on how we have to treat informal/formal
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care should be conducted with the use of scientiﬁc evidence such as that from in-person
surveys around the region of East Asia.
Informal care has been increasingly treated as an urgent topic in health economics.
Van Houtven and Norton (2004) investigated the possibility of substituting informal care
given by adult children with formal care by using 1998 Health and Retirement Surveys
(HRS) and 1995 Asset and Health Dynamics in the Oldest-Old Panel Survey (AHEAD)
in the United States. In their study, formal-care services were used as dependent vari-
ables and the hours of informal care with numerous demographic statistics were used as
independent variables. Although HRS and AHEAD represent excellent panel data on
in-person surveys, there are no comparable databases to match these in Japan1 . It has
been concluded that informal care reduces home health-care use and delays entry into
nursing homes.
AHEAD was also used by Charles and Sevak (2005). They investigated the relation-
ship between informal care and nursing-home entry. This study focused on the eﬀect
of substituting informal caregivers with institutional care since nursing is often given in
certain institutions. They indicated that there was a negative correlation, which led to
a reduced risk of nursing-home entry caused by informal care.
Bolin et al. (2007) researched the relationship between informal and formal care by
using Surveys of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). They found from
their results on almost all countries in the European Union 1) that informal and formal
care can be substituted, 2) that informal care complements doctor or hospital care, and
3) that there are more informal caregivers in southern Europe than in the north, which
is compatible with the cultural context. In addition, SHARE also provides an excellent
survey database just like AHEAD.
The conventional perspective is that daughters tend to be better caregivers than
sons. Van Houten and Norton (2008) analyzed the eﬀect of substituting informal medical
caregivers and associated the results with their gender and marital status in the United
States. As a result of using Standard Analytic Files of Medicare Claims (SAFMC) and
1MHLW has been conducted Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions, which data is available
in the website (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-hss/cslc-index.html). They collect personal
responses as for long term care, such as “caring time by main care-taker living with persons requiring care
by level of long-term care”. However, there are no thorough panel survey data like AHEAD in Japan.
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AHEAD, they found that gender did not matter, married children were less eﬀective
caregivers than those who remained unmarried, and the related costs of medical care for
single elderly could be reduced by their children.
Van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007) evaluated the monetary value of providing
informal care. They used a Likert scale for a “happiness question” as dependent variables
from mail survey data in the Netherlands. They found that an extra hour of informal
care is worth about eight or nine Euros if the care recipient is a family member, while
this is seven or nine Euros if he/she is not2. They concluded their methods could include
all costs and eﬀects associated with informal caregivers, which has scarcely been done
before.
It has been demonstrated that informal care can be substituted for formal care, and
that the value of informal care should/can be evaluated. To the best of our knowledge,
in-person databases and the evaluation of informal care appear to be limited in Japan.
We need to clarify how the burden of elderly care should be treated and evaluated as soon
as possible. Thus, we conducted choice experiments (CE) with attributes on elderly-care
services provided at home in Japan to estimate the preferences family members had for
care plans by explicitly presenting them with the burdens of elderly care . To take their
preference heterogeneity into consideration, we used a Random Parameter Logit (RPL)
Model with repeated data.
The following sections are organized as follows. We explain the survey design and
RPL in Section 2. The estimation results are presented in Section 3. We detail and
interpret these results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Survey Design
The mailed survey was conducted in January 2006 in the city of Sanda in Japan. Sanda
is located in the south of Hyogo prefecture and is one of the dormitory suburbs of western
Japan. Residents of the city provide intensive long-term care for the elderly, which is
why we selected it as the area for the survey. This survey was conducted to clarify the
2They simultaneously conducted the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), which estimated 10.52
Euros per hour to be the cost of informal care.
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current situation with care receivers in the city and the preferences informal caregivers
had for care plans for the elderly. The caregivers who were respondents consisted of
family members caring for those who were authorized to receive support/care. They
were using home or institutional care services. We obtained 1,270 responses from home-
care providers from 1,894 mailed surveys (67.1%), and 299 responses from institutional
care providers from 509 mailed surveys (58.7%). We decided to use only home-care data
since it was much clearer who provided informal/formal care simultaneously than who
provided institutional care.
We asked the family caregivers the individual characteristics and CE questions below
in our survey. The descriptive statistics are listed in Table 1:
2.2 Choice Experiment
Conjoint analysis is advantageous for simultaneously evaluating several kinds of values or
features. Conjoint analysis started with the concept of “Conjoint Measurement” (Luce
and Tukey, (1964))3. Then, practical methods were developed for psychometrics and
marketing (Louviere et al. (2000)). They asked subjects to choose the best type (Choice
Experiment: CE) and rank the types (Contingent Ranking) such that they clariﬁed
their preferences for each attribute as options. CE is especially reliable because of its
improvements in methodology.
We selected four attributes, i.e., 1) the number of visits by authorized caregivers, 2)
the number of day-service uses, which involved formal care, 3) the burden of family care,
which involved the burden of informal care by the elderly, and 4) the fees for plans, which
involved self-payments by the care receivers with insurance payments excluded4.
The main eﬀect of fractional factorial design was used to decrease the number of
proﬁles out of the full combination of 4× 2× 4× 5 = 160. Twenty proﬁles were created
and the choice sets were created by selecting two proﬁles randomly with the “no choice”
option attached5. We asked each respondent the CE questions ﬁve times.
3Debreu (1960) classiﬁed conjoint measurement with cardinal utility theory. However, Luce and
Tukey (1964) expressed conjoint measurement with mathematical algebra, which promoted a practical
methodology.
4The MHLW in Japan has passed regulations that those being cared for should pay 10% of all costs
along with the care plan.
5This is also called the “opt-out” option. Ryan and Sk˚atun (2004) recommended including the “opt-
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Family Caregiver at Home
Items Sub-items No. of Ans. ％
Sex of Caregiver Male 139 17.7
Female 189 62.2
No Answer 158 20.1
Age of Caregiver 20+ 3 0.4
30+ 17 2.2
40+ 104 13.2
50+ 234 29.8
60+ 133 16.9
70+ 112 14.2
80+ 26 3.3
90+ 0 0
No Answer 157 20
Mean 59.1
Standard Deviation 11.452
Occupation of Caregiver Self-Employed 61 7.8
Full-Time Job 66 8.4
Part-Time Job 105 13.4
Unemployed 376 47.8
Others 21 2.7
No Answer 157 20
Use of Formal Care at Home Use 206 26.2
Non-Use 351 44.7
No Answer 229 29.1
Mean No. of Uses per Month 11.8
Standard Deviation 11.989
Day Service Use 251 31.9
Non-Use 304 38.7
No Answer 231 29.4
Mean No. of Uses per Month 7.7
Standard Deviation 4.358
2.3 Random Parameter Logit Model
The econometric model is based on the Random Utility Model (RUM, Louviere et al.
(2000)). RUM is used to deﬁne the utility of a respondent who chooses alternative i in
Eq. (1):
out” option since CE must mimic real behavior to alleviate hypothetical bias.
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Uj = Vi + i =
M∑
m=1
βmxmi + i (1)
Here, Vi denotes the observable component, while i denotes the unobservable error com-
ponent. Xmi (m = 1, · · · ,M) denotes M kinds of attributes that consist of the alterna-
tives, which come with the marginal utility, βm. The additive separated form is frequently
adopted6.
McFadden (1974) proves that the choice probability of i in J alternatives becomes
the Conditional Logit (CL) model with the ﬁrst extreme value distribution assumed on
the error component as:
Pj =
exp (Vj)∑J
j=1 exp (Vj)
(2)
Revelt and Train (1998) demonstrated that RPL with repeated data to estimate the
choice probability with preference heterogeneity could relax the assumptions of CL; they
derived preference homogeneity and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The
choice probability of respondent n consists of7
Pni =
∫
ΠTt=1
exp (Vj)∑J
j=1 exp (Vj)
f(β|Ω)dβ (3)
Here, T denotes the number of times that the respondent answered CE and Ω denotes the
parameter space of β , such as the mean and standard deviation. We use this deﬁnition
for the choice probability. Which attribute is preferred heterogeneously can be analyzed
by using estimated Ω. The statistic in Eq. (4) below can be estimated by Monte Carlo
simulation (Mitani (2009)):
Λ =
σ
µ
(4)
Here, σ denotes the standard deviation parameters of coeﬃcients, while µ denotes the
mean parameters. We did 10,000 simulations to stabilize our analyses.
The implicit price (IP) or marginal willingness to pay of each attribute can be esti-
mated as:
6The “true” marginal utility is confounded by the scale parameter, which is proportionate to variance
in the error component. The scale parameter is frequently assumed to be unity, which we have also
assumed.
7When assuming IIA, the attributes, the characteristics of the alternatives, and/or the error component
in the alternatives have been considered to be independent, which is a restriction that is very diﬃcult to
overcome.
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IP = −βx
βp
(5)
Here, βp denotes the mean parameter of the marginal utility of the price attribute, while
βx denotes that of the other attributes.
3 Results
In estimating IP with RPL, we assumed a normal distribution to be a “mixing dis-
tribution” which is the probabilistic distribution of coeﬃcients. We used the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) when selecting the model, while we used McFadden’s Rho
as the index of model ﬁtness. The results are listed in Table 3.
All the mean parameters are statistically signiﬁcant and compatible with sound intu-
ition. More numbers of visits (visits) or day service uses (day) are preferred, while greater
family-care burdens (family) or more fees for plans (fees) are considered unfavorable.
Table 2: Attribute Level
Attribute (Unit) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
No. of Visits by Authorized Caregiver 0 1 2 3
(times/week)
No. of Day Service Uses (days/week) 0 1
Family-care Burdens (hours/week) 0 4 8 12
Fees for Plans (yen/week) 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
Figure 1: Choice Set Example
The constant for the no choice option (const) is positively signiﬁcant, which means
every factor that leads to “no choice” is represented by that constant and respondents are
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even satisﬁed with the decision of “no choice”. Some respondents chose “no choice” in
the ﬁrst/last question of the CE sequence; the others chose from the middle. Therefore,
it is possible to say that respondents chose “no choice” when the confronting CE made it
too diﬃcult for them to choose Plan A/B. Since “const” is positive, they were satisﬁed
with choosing “no choice”. This suggested that the “no choice” option was required as
expected, and that hypothetical bias was reduced in our results.
We then investigated how the marginal utilities were dispersed. The results are listed
in Table 4. The dispersion of the coeﬃcient of “family” is most moderate as the absolute
value, which means that there are few heterogeneous preferences with the family-care
burden compared to the other attributes. Finally, we obtained the IPs of each attribute
by using the mean parameters in Table 5.
Each IP means the willingness by family caregivers to pay by themselves. The esti-
mated IP of the number of visits ranges from 312 to 6,144 yen/time, while the actual
self-payment is approximately set at 210 to 680 yen corresponding to the care within two
hours. That of the number of day-service uses ranges from 108 to 12,870 yen/day, while
the actual self-payment is approximately set at 290 to 1,400 yen/day. Thus, it seems
that family caregivers prefer a great deal of formal care. This suggests that the actual
self-payments for formal care can be increased more than they are at the current level.
However, the mean IP of the family burden is -691 yen/hour where the conﬁdence
interval ranges from -272 to -3,883, which implies that additional family-care burdens
can be monetarily charged up to that level. Thus, this suggests that the burden can be
oﬀset by 691 yen/hour at the mean IP, which has to be paid for family caregivers since
they were the respondents in this survey.
4 Discussion
Although there were heterogeneous preferences, their structure was compatible to intu-
ition even when the family-care burden was explicitly demonstrated. This suggested that
there was a consensus view of the family-care burden. They may have accepted that
there can excessive burdens when family members informally care for their elderly, which
seems to be standard practice throughout Japan.
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Table 4: Dispersion of Coeﬃcients
Visits Day Family Fees
Mean of Λ 3.51 5.381 -1.793 -6.315
(95% Confidence Interval) (2.070 / 8.494) (2.751 / 23.685) (-2.654 / -1.303) (-30.715 / -2.981)
Table 5: Estimated IP
Visits Day Family
Mean of IP 1,163 yen/time 2,379 yen/day -691 yen/hour
(95％ Conﬁdence Interval) (312 / 6,144) (108 / 12,870) (-272 / -3,883)
Since informal care tends to be free of charge, it has not been compensated especially
in Japan. There are ﬁve main compensation schemes according to Ungerson (1997).
These are 1) caregiver allowances that are subsidized by taxes and social security systems,
2) proper wages that are paid by the government for informal care, 3) routed wages that
are paid by the government via those receiving care, 4) symbolic payments that are paid
to the family who are providing care, and 5) paid volunteers who are remunerated by
volunteer organizations. Discussion on the implementation of these schemes has been
avoided in Japan.
Although the public insurance system for elderly care has compensated caregivers,
the system does not work suﬃciently well due to numerous problems such as budget
deﬁcits. In addition, Japanese informal caregivers seem to be unable to keep on caring
for the elderly in the current situation. Because of this, we need to ensure that caregivers
will be given allowances or proper wages, or volunteers will be paid by conventional local
communities throughout Japan. In addition, exemptions from care insurance should be
granted as indirect compensation.
Temporary family caregivers are authorized in Japan in rural areas where the in-
surance system is not available such as on isolated islands. This arrangement can be
classiﬁed as a hybrid between caregiver allowances, proper wages, and paid volunteering.
The wages are paid by the government via certain private organizations of caregivers.
However, it may be diﬃcult to expand this simply since this system involves many re-
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quirements and certain prohibitions such as those in MHLWOrder No. 31, which contains
standards on the staﬀ of businesses such as those that have designated home services,
facilities, and administration.
There are numerous informal care systems that provide allowances in the world (Fu-
jisawa and Colombo (2009), Goodhead and McDonald (2007)), which would be helpful
to give compensation to caregivers who provide informal care to the elderly throughout
Japan. First, there are many countries that administer beneﬁts to employees who have
to take care of their family members. One of these is 1) Australia where family caregivers
are employees who are paid for less than 20 hours/week; their allowances are not taxable
if the caregivers or care recipients are below the legal limit for the age pension. Another
is 2) Canada where compassionate care beneﬁts are only given to employees even though
there are some legal requirements. Another is 3) Germany where a long-term-care in-
surance fund makes contributions to employees who ought to be family caregivers up to
a ceiling in the statutory pension scheme. Another country is 4) the United Kingdom
where caregivers on low incomes can be fully covered for the basic pension and they
can accumulate pension credits based on a low earning threshold. Another country is
5) Sweden where those taking care leave are entitled to pension credits depending on
their income. 6) New Zealand gives general beneﬁts rather than those only concentrated
on family caregivers. These are authorized by administrative agencies with some legal
strategies, such as the United Kingdom Caregivers Strategy introduced in 1999.
Not just direct compensation but indirect compensation should be considered in
Japan. Direct compensation advocates that the beneﬁts for employees be reconsidered
or improved with reference to systems in other countries (1)-6)). Moreover, general ben-
eﬁts and allowances are recommended to support not only employees but other members
such as household workers. Indirect compensation involves awarding care-insurance ex-
emptions to those who are on child-care leave from their oﬃces. However, there have
been no cases of certiﬁed exemptions given to those who are on elderly-care leave. To
ensure the continuity of care giving by family members, we advocate that the system of
care-insurance exemptions be improved as quickly as possible.
According to the IP estimate of the family-care burden, 691 yen/hour should be paid
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to family caregivers on average when awarding certain compensation. In comparison,
the minimum wage was set at 712 yen/hour in Hyogo Prefecture including the city of
Sanda in 2009. We advocate that a payment level for alleviating the family burden be
set, at least, according to the minimum wage8. The ﬁnancial crisis can be mitigated
in part by awarding compensation to alleviate the family burden. The public insurance
system has also been paying additional amounts for authorized caregivers ’visits of, at
least, 1,520 yen/hour9. Thus, this suggests that we can decrease the current budget for
public-care insurance even when the family burden is compensated for along with the
minimum wage with ceteris paribus, even though an additional monitoring system may
have to be organized.
5 Concluding Remarks
The preference of caregivers to mitigate the burden of caring for the elderly has not been
suﬃciently investigated for a long time, especially from a microeconomic perspective.
We conducted a CE by investigating the burden imposed by informal elderly care with
attributes of services available at home in Japan to estimate the preferences of caregivers
for care plans.
When the burden of care was explicitly treated in CE, caregivers reached a consensus
that there was excessive burden when family members were involved in informal care.
Therefore, we clariﬁed that we should take into consideration the construction of some
kind of compensation scheme to alleviate the burden on caregivers, especially that on
family member. In addition, the discussion on compensation schemes suggested that the
minimum wage should be taken into consideration .
We need to further investigate what the best compensation scheme is for Japan, and
how the current situation with those receiving care and their caregivers is. We advocated
that family caregivers be compensated with direct and general allowances and that care-
8There may have been some disagreement on how the minimum wage has to be calculated. It seems
possible to assume respondents in our survey react with reference to the level of the minimum wage at
the time of the survey. Thus, we omitted the discussion on the minimum wage.
9The initial payment was set at 2,962 yen/hour. If the care time exceeds one and a half hours, the
additional payment is 844 yen per half hour, while the care receiver ’s self-payment is 85 yen (10% of
the total payment). Therefore, the public insurance system has been paying about 1,520 (≈ 844 × 2 ×
0.9)yen/hour.
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insurance exemptions are awarded to them with reference to systems operating in other
countries. It is therefore more necessary than ever before to thoroughly consider what the
roles of informal and formal care are and what their relationship is with each other. While
many existing studies such as those by Van Houtven and Norton (2004) have advocated
substitutive structures for informal and formal care, we should do further research on how
these can be implemented in Japan, where social surveys should provide us with beneﬁcial
insights into these issues. Within the context of our survey, our intention was not that
informal care should be expanded or developed, but that it is properly compensated
and this suggested research on how to improve formal care . Each sector that supplies
caregivers, either informal or formal, can oﬀer choice options or alternatives if they can
be proved to be substitutes for each other. More accurate information on demographics
should be collected when conducting surveys. This is much more helpful in targeting
political considerations, even though we unfortunately could not ﬁnd any socio-economic
characteristics that were statistically signiﬁcant covariates of the utility function in this
article. When using these covariates, we should be able to determine who should be
supported with allowances or exemptions and to what extent.
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